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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the California Public Employees Pension 
System (“CalPERS”) has received extensive attention for its active 
participation in corporate governance. CalPERS’s activities 
established it as a leader among activist institutions.1 CalPERS’s 
 
 *  Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
 **  T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Jeff Gordon, 
Keith Johnson, Un Kyung Park, Wayne Schneider, Damon Silvers, Randall Thomas, and John 
Wilcox for their valuable help in project design and for their useful comments. 
 1. See CalPERS, CalPERS Shareowner Forum, http://www.calpersgovernance.org/forum 
home.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2007) (“The California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(known as ‘CalPERS’) has long been a leader in the corporate governance movement.”). 
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strategy was based on identifying underperforming companies with 
poor governance practices and then working to change those 
governance practices and improve performance.2 Through its 
implementation of this strategy, CalPERS was at the forefront of 
broader-based initiatives to increase shareholder monitoring, 
initiatives that included the use of shareholder proposals to improve 
corporate governance and support of the SEC’s shareholder direct 
access proposal.3 CalPERS also embraced Congress’s invitation to 
public pension funds to take an active role in monitoring securities 
fraud class actions through its visible and influential role in the high- 
profile Cendant litigation.4 
CalPERS has served as a case study for many as a model of 
institutional activism. Academics, regulators, and policymakers have 
looked to the examples of CalPERS and several other public pension 
funds to support the claims that institutional investors can use their 
substantial equity stakes and sophistication effectively to overcome 
collective action problems, and that institutional activism can improve 
corporate performance.5 Public pension funds hold approximately 20% 
of publicly traded U.S. equity and, according to the U.S. Census 
 
 2. See, e.g., Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Focus List Targets 11 Companies for 
Lagging Stock, Financial, Governance Performance (Mar. 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2007/march/focus-list-targets-11.xml 
(describing CalPERS’s focus list strategy). At least one study found this strategy to be 
remarkably successful. See Steven Nesbitt, Long-term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A 
Study of the “CalPERS” Effect, 6 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 78 (1994) (finding a cumulative increase 
averaging 41.3% for each company over a five-year period subsequent to CalPERS’s intervention, 
following a period of relative under-performance); see also LILLI A. GORDON & JOHN POUND, 
ACTIVE INVESTING IN THE U.S. EQUITY MARKET: PAST PERFORMANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS: A 
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM 21, 44 (1993) 
(finding that activist investment strategies used by CalPERS produced superior returns). But see 
Sanford M. Jacoby, Convergence by Design: The Case of CalPERS in Japan, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 
239, 248-49 (2007) (describing conflicting empirical research on the effectiveness of CalPERS’s 
activism). 
 3. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 2, at 245-46 (describing CalPERS’s frequent use of 
shareholder proposals relating to corporate governance in the late 1980s). 
 4. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 149 (D.N.J. 1998) (appointing the 
CalPERS Group as lead plaintiff). 
 5. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, The Problematic Status of Employee Compensation and 
Retiree Pension Security: Resisting the State, Reforming the Corporation, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 37, 
54 (1995) (“The Calpers model powerfully demonstrates that stockholder activism by public 
sector pension funds can have very positive influences upon corporate profitability through 
effective corporate leadership.”); Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional 
Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 251 (1996) (reporting that CalPERS received a 
return of almost $19 million on its $3.5 million investment in activism during the period from 
1987 to 1993); see also S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 
(explaining the adoption of the lead plaintiff provision in the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, stating that “[t]he Committee believes that increasing the role of 
institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit the class and assist the courts”). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010330
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Bureau, held over $2.5 trillion in cash and securities as of the end of 
2004-05.6 Collectively, public pension funds have the potential to be a 
powerful shareholder force, and the example of CalPERS and its 
activities have spurred many to advocate greater institutional 
activism. 
CalPERS is only one fund, however. There are a substantial 
number of public pension funds—at least 2,656 as of 2005.7 Many of 
these funds are relatively new; they were formed as a result of 
revisions to state and municipal benefit programs.8 Accordingly, in 
order to understand the potential role of public pension funds in 
corporate governance, we go beyond CalPERS in this Article. Little is 
known about the vast majority of public pension funds and their 
involvement in corporate governance. What, if any, governance 
activities are other public pension funds involved in, and why? 
This Article offers some preliminary data. Using a combination 
of publicly available information, interviews, and survey data, the 
Article provides a status report on the developing role of public 
pension funds in corporate governance. In part, a description of 
institutional activism is a moving target. Many funds report that they 
have increased or changed the nature of their activity in response to 
legislation, experience, or market developments. At the same time, our 
data reveal important factors concerning the overall level and type of 
public pension fund activism. Our primary focus is on discerning what 
factors correlate with (and potentially cause) public pension funds to 
engage in a particular form of activism. 
What have we learned? First, activity levels vary dramatically. 
Although some funds engage in a substantial amount of governance 
activity, a significant number do little or nothing. The most significant 
factor distinguishing among funds is size: funds with more assets 
under management are far more active in corporate governance. 
Second, public pension funds engage in a very limited spectrum of 
activities. Virtually no funds in our sample played any role in the 
nomination of director candidates, formally or informally. Similarly, 
although CalPERS has made high profile use of the shareholder 
 
 6. U.S. Census Bureau, National Summary of State and Local Government Employee-
Retirement System Finances: Fiscal Year 2004-2005 (Sept. 22, 2007),  
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/retire/2005ret01-txt.txt. 
 7. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 State and Local Government Retirement System Survey 
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/retire05view.html (reporting that 2005 
survey “covered 2,656 public employee retirement systems”). 
 8. See Marguerite Schneider, The Status of U.S. Public Pension Plans, 25 REV. PUB. 
PERSONNEL ADMIN. 107, 108 (2005) (reporting that, in 1998, there were only 700 public employee 
retirement systems). 
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proposal process, very few other funds have followed its example. For 
the most part, public pension fund activism is limited to low-visibility 
activities, such as participation in corporate governance organizations 
or withholding votes from a management nominee. One of the best 
examples is the widespread willingness to withhold votes from 
director candidates. Proxy advisory services frequently will 
recommend a director “withhold” vote, and many institutions follow 
such recommendations. Unlike other forms of activism, such as 
nominating a competing slate of directors, a director withhold vote 
does not single out a fund as an activist. This makes withholding votes 
a relatively low cost and low risk form of activism.  
Finally, our data reveal a marked contrast between litigation—
specifically service as lead plaintiff in securities fraud litigation—and 
non-litigation activism. Smaller funds and funds that delegate more 
functions and rely on the resources and incentives of outside agents—
including active portfolio managers and proxy advisory services, such 
as Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”)—engage in less non-
litigation activism. Public pension funds participate much more 
extensively in shareholder litigation than in other governance 
activities. Despite the importance of asset size and delegation for non-
litigation participation levels, we also find that for litigation-related 
activism, smaller funds and funds that delegate participate with equal 
frequency. 
What is the significance of these findings? Our findings offer 
reasons to be skeptical of the so-called promise of institutional 
activism. If the vast majority of public pension funds do not 
participate extensively in corporate governance, reforms such as the 
1992 amendments to the federal proxy rules, which eased restrictions 
on the ability of funds to communicate on matters relating to a proxy 
vote, may be of limited value. Limited shareholder participation also 
may hamper the potential effectiveness of proposals that would allow 
direct shareholder nomination of directors.  Most importantly, we 
report extensive delegation of governance decisions to external agents, 
including portfolio managers and proxy advisors.  This delegation 
raises a substantial concern that the effectiveness of institutional 
activism will be limited by fund agency problems, including the 
economic incentives of those exercising delegated governance powers. 
Our predictions in this context are limited to public pension 
funds. To the extent that reform proposals to facilitate shareholder 
activism are implemented, those reforms may, of course, be used by 
other types of institutions. Current evidence shows, for example, that 
CHOI-FISCH_PAGE 3/25/2008 9:36:58 AM 
2008] ON BEYOND CalPERS 319 
hedge funds are far more active than public pension funds in seeking 
board representation.9 Similarly, union funds, unlike public pension 
funds, make regular use of the shareholder proposal rule.10 
Investment companies (mutual funds) generally are reluctant to 
engage in more visible forms of activism and have not taken an active 
role in shareholder litigation.11 
Despite the pessimistic outlook for public pension fund 
activism in general, the reluctance on the part of funds to engage in 
visible activism has led to limited coalition-building efforts between 
more activist and less activist funds. Public pension funds may lend 
support to other more activist shareholders. The simplest form of 
“coalition” involves anonymously voting with a more activist fund. 
While few institutions are willing to take up the high profile activism 
of CalPERS, many more institutions are willing to support CalPERS 
with their votes. Our interviews reveal that activist union funds (often 
larger, national union funds) are particularly eager to solicit the 
support of more activist public pension funds, which can add both 
legitimacy and votes to union-sponsored initiatives. 
The difference between public pension fund participation in 
litigation and non-litigation forms of governance sheds light on what 
motivates funds toward activism. The extensive participation in 
litigation by both larger and smaller funds is in marked contrast to 
some of the funds’ own explanations for their activity level (or lack 
thereof). Many funds in our sample responded that they were 
reluctant to engage in activism because of their small size and limited 
staff and resources. They also cited their desire to avoid 
confrontational behavior. Yet despite the fact that litigation is openly 
confrontational, is a distraction of staff time and resources, and fails 
to provide lead plaintiffs with greater returns than those available 
 
 9. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024-42, 1062-72 (2007) (describing hedge fund 
activism). 
 10. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 
465, 477 (2003) (“[B]y the mid-1990s, labor unions had replaced public pension funds as the 
dominant institutional investors submitting shareholder proposals.”); Stewart J. Schwab & 
Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998) (describing union fund activism and use of shareholder proposals). 
 11. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with the assistance of Dana Kiku, Does the 
Plaintiff Matter?: An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1609 (2006) (“[O]ur data contains no settlement where a bank, mutual 
fund, or insurance company has served as a lead plaintiff in a securities class action.”); Michael 
Perino, Institutional Activism through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund 
Participation in Securities Class Actions 11 n.5 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research, Working 
Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (describing large mutual 
funds as “entirely absent from the ranks of lead plaintiffs”). 
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through free-riding, funds are surprisingly willing to participate—
even funds that are unwilling to engage in non-litigation related 
activity. This willingness to participate in litigation-related activity 
undermines the notion that cost and a general preference against 
activism fully explain fund passivity. 
There are several possible explanations for the widespread 
participation of public pension funds in litigation. One possibility is 
that public pension funds are responding directly to Congress’s 
invitation for greater litigation participation, as embodied in the lead 
plaintiff provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (“PSLRA”).12 Public pension funds in particular may be 
concerned about the legitimacy of shareholder activism. Such funds 
may view the PSLRA as explicitly endorsing their service as lead 
plaintiffs in a way that distinguishes that role from other types of 
activism. Another possibility is that the legislation has mobilized 
plaintiffs’ law firms to encourage and facilitate fund involvement in 
litigation and that these entrepreneurial efforts have spurred fund 
participation. A third possibility is that litigation decisions are subject 
to a different decisionmaking structure within the fund. Our 
interviews suggest that litigation decisions may, in particular, be 
subject to greater influence by the state Attorney General. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains our 
methodology. Part II offers summary statistics about the responding 
funds, a description of the types and levels of fund activism, and 
summary statistics about fund voting structure and participation in 
litigation. Part III describes our analysis of the data, including the 
relationship between fund-specific characteristics and the level of 
shareholder activism. We focus on testing the correlation between two 
fund characteristics—fund size and fund passivity/delegation—and 
activism levels, looking at both litigation and non-litigation activism. 
Part IV considers the significance of our findings with respect to 
current policy debates and offers some preliminary suggestions about 
the manner in which our data may influence the design of corporate 
governance structures. 
I. METHODOLOGY 
Data collection for this project took place in three stages. The 
first stage consisted of intensive multi-day interviews with two large 
institutional investors. We conducted these interviews in the spring of 
 
 12. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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2005. Their purpose was to gain an understanding of the range of 
institutional players, the types of activism in which those players 
participated, the primary reasons for participation, and recent 
developments and trends that have influenced the role of the 
institutional investor. 
Following these interviews, we developed a set of interview 
questions designed for an in-person or telephone interview. Using 
these questions, we conducted interviews with approximately twenty 
institutional investors during the academic year 2005-06. The 
institutions interviewed reflected a range of institution types, 
including public pension funds, investment companies (mutual funds), 
union funds, foundations, a university endowment, and a non-U.S. 
institutional investor. Despite the use of a standard set of questions, 
these interviews were relatively free-ranging, as we sought to learn 
more about institutional practices as well as the extent to which 
variations in activism were a function of institution type, as opposed 
to other factors such as size, staff, and investment portfolio. We 
collected information on fund practices, fund awareness of governance 
issues and developments, and fund attitudes about corporate 
governance. 
The interviews rapidly demonstrated to us significant 
differences between types of institutional investors. Our responders 
identified several factors contributing to this variation, including 
differences in regulation, market competition and constraints, staff 
size and structure, and compensation structure. As a result, we 
decided to focus the research reported in this Article on a single 
institution type: public pension funds. 
Using the results of our interviews, we constructed a new 
survey designed specifically for public pension funds. The survey 
collected information on a variety of general fund characteristics such 
as size, portfolio composition, investment management structure, and 
decisionmaking structure. It then collected detailed data on the funds’ 
participation in a total of twenty-seven types of non-litigation activism 
activities and eleven types of litigation activism. We identified the 
specific types of activism from activities described by our interviewees 
as important for their institutions. The survey asked the funds to 
identify their primary reasons for engaging in activism and the 
primary reasons for their decision not to participate. The survey also 
sought additional information on a variety of governance practices 
including proxy voting and litigation claims processing. 
We distributed the survey to 124 public pension funds by 
regular mail and e-mail during the summer of 2006. Our sample 
consisted of all the public pension funds whose attorney 
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representatives were members of the National Association of Public 
Pension Fund Attorneys (“NAPPA”). NAPPA is a membership 
organization, limited to attorneys of public pension funds. Its “purpose 
is to provide educational opportunities and informational resources for 
its member attorneys.”13 Specifically, NAPPA is not a shareholder 
activism or corporate governance organization. We selected the 
NAPPA sample, in part, to reduce the risk of selection bias. 
Of the 124 surveys we sent, we received responses from forty 
public pension funds, giving us a response rate of approximately 32%. 
Responding funds ranged in size from less than $1 billion in assets 
under management to approximately $150 billion in assets. Our funds 
came from twenty-five states plus the U.S. Virgin Islands. We closed 
data collection in early December 2006 in order to avoid the risk that 
differences in responses would be the result of developments 
associated with the start of the 2007 proxy season. To test how 
representative our responding funds were of the original set of 124 
funds, we compared publicly available data on the fund assets of the 
responding funds against the eighty-four non-responding funds from 
our original sample.14 For consistency, assets under management were 
determined as of the end of the fund’s prior fiscal year, which was 
generally 2006. The mean asset size for responding funds was $25.4 
billion, compared with $15.8 billion for non-responding funds. This 
difference in the mean asset sizes was not statistically significant. The 
lack of a statistically significant difference in fund asset size between 
responding and non-responding funds supports the view that our 
responding funds were representative of the entire set of surveyed 
funds. 
II. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS 
In this Part, we survey the evidence from our funds and make 
some tentative observations about the nature of fund activism we 
observe. 
A. General Summary Statistics 
Table 1(a) provides summary statistics on firm size and 
investment structure. As indicated above, our responding sample 
includes a representative range of the entire NAAPA set of funds with 
 
 13. NAPPA Home Page, http://www.nappa.org/ (follow “Please Enter” link) (last visited Jan. 
7, 2008). 
 14. Publicly available data were taken from annual reports and comparable documents, 
which were generally available on the Internet. 
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respect to fund size. CalPERS, which is currently the public pension 
fund with the most assets under management, reported total assets 
under management of $232 billion as of January 31, 2007.15 
 
Table 1(a): General Summary Statistics 
 
Firm Size 
Assets Number of Funds Percent 
< $1 billion 2 5.1% 
1-10 billion 14 35.9% 
10-50 billion 17 43.6% 
50-100 billion 4 10.3% 
100-250 billion 2 5.1% 
Total 3916 100.0% 
 
Investment Structure 
Allocation of Assets Mean 25% 50% 75% Std. 
Dev. 
Fraction of Assets 
Managed by External 
Managers 
0.842 0.710 0.995 1.000 0.250 
Fraction of Assets 
Indexed 
0.292 0.110 0.300 0.390 0.200 
Fraction of Assets in 
U.S. Publicly Traded 
Equity 
0.435 0.397 0.435 0.482 0.082 
Fraction of Assets in 
U.S. Debt 
0.247 0.204 0.250 0.300 0.083 
Fraction of Assets in 
International (Non-
U.S.) 
0.203 0.163 0.200 0.232 0.075 
 
A large percentage of public pension fund assets are managed 
externally. As a result, the public pension fund represents a multi-
layered agency relationship in which the external managers, 
themselves often institutional investors such as hedge funds or 
mutual funds, are accountable to fund executives. The fund 
 
 15. CalPERS Investment Facts at a Glance, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/ 
investme.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). 
 16.  One fund is excluded from this table due to inconsistent data on reported assets. 
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executives, in turn, owe their ultimate fiduciary obligations to the 
fund’s beneficiaries. This multi-level relationship has received 
relatively little attention from commentators. We find that, on 
average, 84.2% of fund assets are managed externally. More 
significantly, a substantial number of funds delegate corporate 
governance responsibility, including voting authority, to their external 
portfolio managers.17 Table 1(b) illustrates this delegation. 
 
Table 1(b): Reliance on Agents 
 
Voting Methodology Number of Funds Percent 
Vote Own Proxies 6 15.0% 
Delegate Authority to Proxy Advisor 
(Using Proxy Advisor’s 
Recommendation) 
8 20.0% 
Delegate Authority to Proxy Advisor 
(Using Fund’s Guidelines) 
15 37.5% 
Delegate Authority to External Portfolio 
Manager 
11 27.5% 
Total 40 100.0% 
 
 
Preparation of Voting Guidelines Number of Funds Percent 
Voting Guidelines Prepared In-House 23 57.5% 
Voting Guidelines Outsourced (to Proxy 
Advisor, External Fund Manager, or 
Other Outside Party) 
17 42.5% 
Total 40 100.0% 
 
 
Claims Filing Number of Funds Percent 
Claims Filing Done In-House 6 15.0% 
Claims Filed by Custodian Bank or 
Claims Processing Service 
34 85.0% 
Total 40 100.0% 
 
 17. We note that 69% of our funds retain ISS as their proxy advisor, a statistic that may 
raise concerns about the extent of ISS’s influence over institutional voting decisions. 
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Primary Mechanism to Become 
Aware of Litigation 
Number of Funds Percent 
Outside Law Firm/Retained 
Counsel/Outside Monitoring Law Firm 
15 62.5% 
Litigation Monitoring Service/Investor 
Responsibility Support Services 
(“IRSS”) 
6 25.0% 
Internal Monitoring 2 8.3% 
Other 1 4.2% 
Total 24 100.0% 
 
Public pension fund reliance on agents extends beyond external 
fund managers. As reported in Table 1(b), we find that pension funds 
rely heavily on a variety of agents for services ranging from proxy 
voting and the preparation of voting guidelines to claims filing and 
securities litigation screening. Significantly, we find that funds devote 
limited internal resources to corporate governance, including, as is 
detailed further below, oversight of their agents. Our interviews 
revealed that many funds do not dedicate even a single full-time staff 
position to corporate governance. Similarly, of the funds in our survey, 
only 17.5% have a separate budget for funding participation in 
corporate governance. 
Another interesting fact revealed by our data is that public 
pension funds engage in indexed investing to a lesser degree than is 
sometimes assumed. We find that the average fund indexes only 
29.2% of its assets. This is in marked contrast to TIAA-CREF, for 
example, which indexes 80% of its assets.18 The argument that an 
indexed institution has a greater incentive to focus on monitoring 
because it is locked into the market and cannot discipline issuers 
through exit19 would seem to apply to our sample of public pension 
funds only to a limited extent. Moreover, the failure to index means 
that fund resources are devoted to attempting to improve returns 
through investment rather than governance decisions. 
 
 18. TIAA-CREF, Life Funds Prospectus 47 (May 1, 2007), http://www.tiaa-cref.org/pdf/ 
prospectuses/spia.pdf. 
 19. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1366 (1991) (explaining why monitoring might be 
rational for indexed institutional investors, namely because they are locked into the market). 
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B. Non-Litigation Activism 
Observing non-litigation related fund activity is often difficult. 
Some activities, such as publicly announcing a fund’s votes prior to a 
shareholder meeting, are public. Others are less visible, such as when 
a fund writes a letter to management or informally suggests 
candidates for the board of directors to a company’s nominating 
committee. Our survey method allows us to obtain information on both 
more public and less visible forms of non-litigation activism. 
Table 2 contains the core of our survey results—statistics about 
fund participation in twenty-seven categories of non-litigation 
activism. We identified the activities contained in Table 2 through our 
interviews of institutional investors. They include the universe of non-
litigation forms of corporate governance activism in which various 
types of institutional investors, including public pension funds and 
other institutions, described themselves as participating. In our 
survey, funds were asked to indicate whether they participated in that 
activity and, if so, to characterize their activity level as done either 
“occasionally” or “frequently.” 
 
Table 2: Non-Litigation Related Activism Summary 
Statistics 
 
Activity Never Done Occasionally Frequently 
Writing Letters to 
Management 
53.9% 30.8% 15.4% 
Meeting with 
Management 
64.1% 20.5% 15.4% 
Communicating with 
Other Institutions 
Regarding Corporate 
Governance 
25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 
Soliciting Support for 
Activities from Other 
Institutions (Building 
Coalitions) 
47.5% 35.0% 17.5% 
Participating in 
Corporate Governance 
Organizations 
30.0% 27.5% 42.5% 
Participating in 
Corporate Governance 
Programs 
37.5% 27.5% 35.0% 
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Sponsoring Corporate 
Governance Programs 
75.0% 17.5% 7.5% 
Sponsoring Shareholder 
Proposal 
82.5% 15.0% 2.5% 
Soliciting Votes on 
Shareholder Proposal 
85.0% 10.0% 5.0% 
Formally Nominating 
Director Candidate in 
Opposition to 
Management 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Participating in Proxy 
Contest in Support of 
Other Non-Management 
Nominees 
71.8% 28.2% 0.0% 
Submitting Names of 
Director Candidates to 
Nominating Committee 
90.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Informally Suggesting 
Director Candidates to 
CEO or Other Board 
Members 
87.5% 12.5% 0.0% 
Withholding Votes from 
Management Director 
Candidate 
42.5% 22.5% 35.0% 
Publicly Announcing 
Vote Prior to 
Shareholder Meeting 
85.0% 10.0% 5.0% 
Recalling Loaned Stock 
for Voting 
57.5% 27.5% 15.0% 
Requesting SEC 
Rulemaking 
75.0% 17.5% 7.5% 
Writing Comment 
Letter to SEC 
50.0% 35.0% 15.0% 
Signing Comment Letter 
to SEC (as Part of 
Group) 
42.5% 47.5% 10.0% 
Participating in SEC 
Hearing or Roundtable 
75.0% 22.5% 2.5% 
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Lobbying Congress 
(Formally or Informally) 
with Respect to 
Corporate Governance 
72.5% 27.5% 0.0% 
Lobbying State 
Legislature(s) with 
Respect to Corporate 
Governance 
80.0% 20.0% 0.0% 
Participating in Bar 
Association Activities 
with Respect to 
Corporate Governance 
67.5% 30.0% 2.5% 
Targeted Investing 76.9% 20.5% 2.6% 
Creating Focus Lists for 
Activism 
87.5% 2.5% 10.0% 
Submitting Amicus 
Brief on Corporate or 
Securities Issue 
71.8% 25.6% 2.6% 
Issuing Press Release 
with Respect to Any 
Corporate Governance 
Activities 
72.5% 22.5% 5.0% 
 
The results show substantial variation among activities. As 
Table 2 indicates, there are seven activities in which 50% or more of 
our funds reported participating. Several of these activities involve 
interacting with other institutional investors through coalition 
building, participation in corporate governance organizations and 
programs, and communicating with fellow institutional investors. 
More than half of our funds report writing or signing comment letters 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Additionally, 
57.5% of our funds reported withholding votes from director elections. 
It is worth noting that all of these activities are relatively low  
cost, making them feasible options for institutions that do not have 
resources expressly devoted to corporate governance. In addition, 
these activities do not involve the funds in visible public 
confrontations with management. Because public pension funds do not 
have to report their votes publicly, for example, it is difficult for 
management to identify and challenge specific funds for withholding 
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votes against a director candidate.20 In addition, the widespread use of 
director withhold votes among institutional investors and their 
frequent recommendation by proxy advisory firms have made 
withhold votes relatively common and reduced the political or media 
risk associated with this form of investor activism.21 
Activism addressed to specific companies is far less common. 
Despite media reports that institutional investors engage in frequent 
direct communication with company management, we find that 53.9% 
of our funds never submitted a letter to management, and 64.1% never 
met with management.22 More openly confrontational activity is even 
less frequent; fewer than 20% of funds had submitted a shareholder 
proposal or actively engaged in the solicitation of proxies. Fewer than 
15% of our funds had followed the CalPERS model of identifying 
activism targets through the use of focus lists.23 And, importantly, 
funds almost never are involved in actively challenging management 
control over the nomination and election of directors. None of our 
funds reported nominating a director candidate, and fewer than 15% 
had even submitted the name of a potential director candidate to a 
board member, CEO, or nominating committee. 
Finally, funds reported relatively little involvement in 
policymaking. Only 20% of funds had lobbied their state legislatures 
with respect to corporate governance even occasionally, and only 
27.5% had lobbied Congress. To the extent that funds are concerned 
with policymaking, they are more likely to engage with the SEC; as 
indicated above, more than half the funds reported communicating 
with the SEC through comment letters or testimony. This is consistent 
with our interview findings in which the majority of institutional 
investors identified the SEC as the government agency most 
responsive to the needs of institutional investors. Finally, only 28.1% 
of funds reported submitting an amicus brief on a corporate or 
securities issue, although that number may have increased, as a 
 
 20. Nonetheless, some public pension funds voluntarily disclose their votes. For example, 
CalPERS provides its proxy voting on the web at Proxy Voting Decisions, http://www.calpers-
governance.org/alert/proxy/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).  In addition, management sometimes can 
track withhold votes based on broker voting. 
 21. See Patrick G. Quick, John K. Wilson & Jessica S. Lochmann, Recent Developments 
Regarding Majority Voting in Director Elections, WALL ST. LAW., Jan. 2006, available at 
http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/wsl/wsl0106.html (describing the significance of withhold 
votes among institutional investors). 
 22. One explanation for this is the fact that many public pension funds delegate 
responsibility for corporate governance to their external portfolio managers. It is possible, even 
likely, that those portfolio managers engage in meetings with corporate management or write 
letters in connection with their investment decision-making. 
 23. See Press Release, CalPERS, supra note 2 (describing CalPERS’s focus list strategy). 
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number of public pension funds signed on to amicus briefs in recent 
Supreme Court cases addressing securities fraud litigation.24 
C. Litigation Activism 
With the adoption of the PSLRA and the creation of the lead 
plaintiff provision, institutional investors and public pension funds in 
particular have become increasingly active, serving as lead plaintiffs 
in a higher percentage of cases every year and, on occasion, taking a 
visible role in selecting counsel and negotiating aggressive fee 
agreements. In some cases, institutions exert even more control.25 For 
example, the New York State public pension funds, under the 
leadership of state comptroller Alan Hevesi, were the driving force 
behind requiring individual outside directors to contribute personal 
funds to the settlement of the WorldCom litigation.26 The University 
of California negotiated a similar provision in the Enron settlement.27 
At the same time, concerns about delay, procedural obstacles, 
and, in some cases, lack of control over the selection of lead counsel 
have led some institutional investors to opt out of class litigation in 
favor of pursuing individual cases.28 Institutional investors also 
 
 24. See, e.g., Brief of the N.Y. State Common Retirement Fund et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (No. 
06-484), 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 226 (providing an example of public pension funds signing 
onto amicus briefs in cases addressing securities fraud litigation). 
 25. We both have written extensively about the participation of institutional investors in 
litigation, particularly in securities fraud class action litigation. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. 
Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 888-89 (2005) (analyzing the 
participation of institutional investors in litigation over a ten-year period); Stephen J. Choi & 
Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Era After 
the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1503-07, 1518-30 (2006) (assessing the effects of the 
PSLRA on institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in class actions); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the 
Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 
654-55 (2002) (describing the role and selection of lead counsel in class action litigation). 
 26. See The Director’s Cut, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at A12 (reporting a statement by 
Hevesi that he “felt personally that this would be unfair and not a deterrent for future failures 
on the part of directors if they weren’t held personally liable”). 
 27. Press Release, Univ. of Cal., UC Reaches $168-Million Settlement with Enron Directors 
in Securities Fraud Case (Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/ 
2005/jan07.html. 
 28. See, e.g., Lorraine Woellert, Fractured Class Actions: “Opt-Outs” Are a Growing 
Headache for Companies, BUS. WK., Feb. 27, 2006, at 31 (describing pension fund opt-outs in 
several major cases). In some cases, institutional investors have recovered substantially more 
through individual litigation. See, e.g., Gilbert Chan, CalPERS’ Time Strategy Pays Off: The 
State Pension Fund Gets $117.7 Million After Opting Out of Class-Action Suit Against Media 
Giant, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 15, 2007, at D4 (reporting that by opting out CalPERS received a 
recovery in Time-Warner litigation that was seventeen times what it would have received by 
remaining as a member of the class action). 
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occasionally participate in other types of litigation, such as state court 
derivative suits and appraisal proceedings.29 
We sought to obtain information about public pension fund 
participation in various types of litigation. For those funds that 
participated, we sought to gain a greater understanding of the nature 
of their involvement. Table 3 contains summary statistics for litigation 
activism. As the table shows, activism levels are significantly higher 
for litigation than for non-litigation activity. Fifty-five percent of 
responding funds, for example, reported that they had served as lead 
plaintiff. These findings are consistent with data showing increasing 
involvement by institutional investors in shareholder litigation. 
Cornerstone Research, for example, reported that more than half of all 
suits settled in 2006 had institutional investors as lead plaintiffs.30 
 
Table 3: Litigation Activism Summary Statistics 
 
Activity Percent of Funds That Engaged 
in Activity at Least Once 
Served as Lead Plaintiff in 
Securities Litigation 
55.0% 
Served as Lead Plaintiff in 
Derivative Litigation 
15.0% 
Opted out of Class Action and 
Pursued Individual Securities 
Fraud or Derivative Suit 
60.0% 
Competed with Another Institution 
for Lead Plaintiff Role 
55.0% 
Informally Participated in 
Litigation 
32.5% 
Attempted Unsuccessfully to Serve 
as Lead Plaintiff 
35.0% 
Participated in Litigation over 
Shareholder Proposals 
2.5% 
Sought Appraisal Remedy 2.5% 
Other Corporate/Securities 
Litigation  
10.0% 
 
 29. See Fisch, supra note 25, at 724 (noting that institutions have participated actively in 
some derivative suits). 
 30. See Beth Barr, Securities Class Action Settlements Reach Record Level, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 
29, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1175159036321 (reporting results of 
Cornerstone study). 
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Objected to Proposed Settlement 5.0% 
Objected to Proposed/Requested 
Attorney Fee Award 
25.0% 
 
As media reports indicate, opting out of shareholder litigation 
to pursue an individual claim is relatively common.31 Table 3 reports 
that 60% of funds reported opting out of representative litigation. 
Funds appear to believe that they will recover more money and receive 
payment more quickly when they opt out.32 The media report that 
opting out has been a successful strategy in several high profile 
cases.33 Nonetheless, in the interviews, some institutions reported 
frustration with opting out. 
Funds are much less active in other types of litigation. Only a 
small fraction of funds reported participating in derivative suits, 
appraisal proceedings, and litigation over shareholder proposals. 
Lower participation levels in these forms of litigation activism may be 
driven, in part, by the fact that legal fees may not be available out of 
the resulting common fund as they are in class actions. 
We also asked funds about the manner in which they processed 
securities litigation claims. Our questioning on this topic was 
motivated by highly publicized research by James Cox and Randall 
Thomas reporting that institutional investors failed to file claim forms 
in securities litigation at an alarmingly high rate, leaving billions of 
dollars “on the table.”34 When Cox and Thomas’s research was 
released, more than forty mutual fund managers were sued for failing 
to file claims forms on behalf of their funds.35 It appears that public 
pension funds have responded to the Cox and Thomas research and 
 
 31. See Woellert, supra note 28 (describing a number of pension fund opt-outs). 
 32. See, e.g., Neil L. Selinger, Why Funds Opt Out of Class Action, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS, Feb. 20, 2006, at 12 (explaining that opting out can result in “substantial 
premiums over the class recovery” as well as “an expeditious payment”). 
 33. See, e.g., Woellert, supra note 28 (reporting recoveries by opt outs in Time Warner, 
WorldCom, and other big securities fraud cases). 
 34. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional 
Investors Fail To File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 856-60 (2002); 
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical 
Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in 
Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 425 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, 
Letting Billions]. Cox and Thomas researched filings by “financial institutions,” which they 
defined to include “private and public pension funds, life and casualty insurance companies, 
mutual funds, bank trust departments, and various endowments,” but did not focus specifically 
on public pension funds. Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions, supra at 415. 
 35. See Securities Litigation Watch, http://slw.riskmetrics.com/ (Jan. 25, 2005) (under 
Archives, select “January 2005”) (describing litigation against mutual funds). 
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the admonition that filing claims is one of their fiduciary obligations. 
However, the procedures by which funds handle claims submission 
varies; as reported above in Table 1(b), 85% outsource the process, 
either to their securities custodian or to a claims processing firm, and 
15% handle claims processing internally.36 
An important question is whether the recoveries in investor 
litigation are significant.37 We find that funds in our sample reported 
recovering an average of $6.75 million in the prior fiscal year, an 
amount that represents 0.035% of the average fund’s total assets 
(although the recovery obviously may have a more substantial effect 
on returns). There is considerable variation in fund recoveries, 
ranging from 0.209% of fund assets down to 0.003% of assets. In 
addition, recoveries in securities fraud class actions have grown 
substantially in the past 5 years. Nonetheless, for many funds, it 
remains an open question as to whether litigation recoveries are 
economically significant. Interestingly, 25% of funds reported that 
they do not maintain information on their litigation recoveries. One 
can question whether a fund is meeting its fiduciary obligations if it 
does not even keep track of whether and to what extent it is 
recovering money on its securities claims. 
D. Measuring Activism 
In order to measure activism levels and to test those levels 
against fund-specific factors such as size, we constructed three 
activism indices. The first index, which measures non-litigation 
activism, is based on the information contained in Table 2. For each 
sample fund, we assigned a value of 1 for occasional participation in 
each non-litigation activity and a value of 2 for frequent participation 
in that activity. Summing those numbers for each sample fund gives 
 
 36. An increasing number of firms are offering funds the opportunity to outsource their 
claims processing. One of the best known is Securities Class Action Services (SCAS), a subsidiary 
of ISS. For a description of services provided by SCAS, see Institutional Shareholder Services, 
Securities Class Action Services: Recover Your Clients’ Eligible Assets with Securities Class 
Action Services, available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/securitiesclass.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 
2008). SCAS reported that, in the year 2006, it filed more than 160,000 claims on behalf of its 
clients. Id. Claims filing is also offered by IRSS. Investor Responsibility Support Services, Inc., 
About IRSS, https://www.irss.ws/about.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2008). Plaintiffs’ law firms are 
also offering claims processing. See, e.g., Coughlin Stoia, News, Lerach Coughlin takes on 
Securities Claims Filing (Mar. 3, 2007) http://www.csgrr.com/csgrr-cgi-bin/mil?templ=news/ 
articles/securities_claims_filing.html (highlighting the claims filing services for institutional 
clients Coughlin Stoia (formerly Lerach Coughlin) introduced last year). 
 37. See Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883-84 (2002) (raising this 
question in the context of the Cox and Thomas research). 
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us the non-litigation index, which can range from 0 to a maximum of 
54. 
The second index measures litigation activism. For each 
litigation activity listed in Table 4, we assigned a value of 1 if the fund 
indicated that it participated in the specific activity at least once. The 
litigation index for each sample fund is the sum across all the various 
litigation activity categories, which can range from 0 to 11. 
Lastly, to measure overall activism, we constructed a combined 
activism index. To give equal weight to each non-litigation and 
litigation activity, we assigned a value of 1 for each activity that a 
fund indicated that it had performed at least once. Thus, unlike for 
the Non-Litigation Sum variable, where each activity can range from 0 
to 2, we treat each activity for purposes of constructing the Activism 
index as ranging from 0 to 1. The activism index is the sum of the 
values assigned to each activity—both non-litigation and litigation—
for each fund and can range from 0 to 38. Table 4 reports summary 
statistics on our three measures of fund activity. We use these 
measures of activism in the next Part to test the extent to which fund-
specific characteristics correlate with activism levels. 
 
Table 4 
 
Measures of Activity Mean 25% 50% 75% Std. Dev. 
Non-Litigation Sum 11.675 4.500 8.500 16.500 10.866 
Litigation Sum  2.975 1.000 3.000 4.000 2.166 
Activism 12.000 6.000 11.500 17.000 8.735 
 
III. FUND-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS AND LEVELS OF ACTIVISM 
We test the relationship between various characteristics of a 
fund and the level of activism in which a fund engages. Our tests focus 
on two hypotheses on how fund characteristics may relate to activism. 
First, we test the relationship of fund size with activism. We 
hypothesize that size will correlate with a greater inclination to 
engage in activism. Larger funds are better able to spread the fixed 
costs of researching corporate governance issues, participating in 
proxy contests, and so on. Specifically, we test whether size is equally 
important for both non-litigation and litigation-related activism. 
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Second, we hypothesize that funds that delegate more of their 
functions will engage in less activism. Funds that delegate more 
functions will have fewer in-house resources with which to engage in 
activism. Similarly, delegation may reflect a structural preference 
against outside actions, including activism. We test in particular 
whether the delegation of functions correlates with levels of litigation 
and non-litigation activism. 
A. Fund Size and Activism 
The costs of engaging in activism are largely fixed. The costs of 
serving as lead plaintiff in a securities class action are roughly the 
same whether the plaintiff is a small or large fund. The costs of 
soliciting proxies for a shareholder proposal do not vary with the size 
of the fund. Given the mostly fixed costs of activism, larger funds have 
an economic advantage in pursuing activism. Large funds are able to 
spread the cost of activism across this larger asset base. In addition, 
large funds are likely to have larger staffs and budgets, making it 
easier for the funds to devote a portion of both to activism. Even 
relatively small activism costs may overwhelm the operating budget of 
smaller funds. 
Because of the cost advantage accruing to larger funds, we 
predict that larger funds will engage in more activism. We define 
“Small Funds” as funds with assets less than $10 billion. Large 
Funds” are defined as funds with $10 billion or more in assets. Table 5 
explores in more detail the relationship between fund size and 
activism. We report the p-value from a t-test of the difference in the 
means between small funds and large funds.   
 
Table 5: Fund Size and Activism 
 
Non-Litigation Activity Small 
Funds  
Large 
Funds  
p-
value 
Writing Letters to Management 0.133 0.917 0.001 
Meeting with Management 0.400 0.583 0.469 
Communicating with other Institutions 
Regarding Corporate Governance 
0.688 1.208 0.022 
Soliciting Support from Other Institutions 
(Building Coalitions) 
0.438 0.875 0.073 
Participating in Corporate Governance 
Organizations 
0.625 1.458 0.002 
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Participating in Corporate Governance 
Programs 
0.563 1.250 0.012 
Sponsoring Corporate Governance Programs 0.000 0.542 0.005 
Sponsoring Shareholder Proposal 0.000 0.333 0.024 
Soliciting Votes on Shareholder Proposal 0.125 0.250 0.460 
Formally Nominating Director Candidate in 
Opposition to Management 
0.000 0.000 — 
Participating in Proxy Contest in Support of 
Other Non-Management Nominees 
0.200 0.333 0.381 
Submitting Names of Director Candidates to 
Nominating Committee 
0.000 0.167 0.089 
Informally Suggesting Director Candidates 
to CEO or Other Board Members 
0.000 0.208 0.053 
Withholding Votes from Management 
Director Candidate 
0.563 1.167 0.033 
Publicly Announcing Vote Prior to 
Shareholders’ Meeting 
0.188 0.208 0.902 
Recalling Loaned Stock for Voting 0.188 0.833 0.006 
Requesting SEC Rulemaking 0.000 0.542 0.005 
Writing Comment Letter to SEC 0.250 0.917 0.004 
Signing Comment Letter to SEC (as Part of a 
Group) 
0.438 0.833 0.061 
Participating in SEC Hearing or Roundtable 0.000 0.458 0.004 
Lobbying Congress (Formally or Informally) 
on Corporate Governance 
0.188 0.333 0.324 
Lobbying State Legislature(s) on Corporate 
Governance 
0.125 0.250 0.345 
Participating in Bar Association Activities 
with Respect to Corporate Governance 
0.188 0.458 0.117 
Targeted Investing 0.067 0.375 0.059 
Creating Focus Lists for Activism 0.000 0.375 0.060 
Submitting Amicus Brief on Corporate or 
Securities Issue 
0.200 0.375 0.314 
Issuing Press Release with Respect to Any of 
Your Corporate Governance Activities 
0.125 0.458 0.071 
Non-litigation sum 5.625 15.708 0.003 
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We find that, for virtually every type of non-litigation activism, 
large funds are significantly more active than small funds. In 
addition, the Non-Litigation Sum measure is significantly greater for 
large funds as compared with small funds. 
What drove fund participation in non-litigation activism? Table 
6 gives a breakdown of the primary reasons for participation and non-
participation as indicated by our responding funds. 
 
Table 6: Reasons for Non-Litigation Activism 
 
Reason for 
Participating 
Number of Funds Percentage 
Improved Returns 14 38.9% 
Fiduciary Duties 4 11.1% 
Significant Public 
Interest 
4 11.1% 
Other 6 16.7% 
Did Not Participate 8 22.2% 
Total 36 100.0% 
Note: “Other” includes the fund board required more activity to become aware of 
corporate governance issues, among others. 
 
Reason for Not 
Participating 
Number of Funds Percentage 
Lack of Resources 16 44.4% 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Against Participation 
11 30.6% 
Lack of Authority; Not 
Authorized by Trustee 
or Board; Reluctance of 
Trustee or Board to 
Become Active 
6 16.7% 
Other 3 8.3% 
Total 36 100.0% 
Note: “Other” includes delegation of participation decisions to external managers, the 
desire to avoid potentially contentious issues, and the desire to avoid getting entangled 
in openly public “headline” activism. 
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Note that 38.9% of funds gave “improved returns” as their 
primary reason, constituting 50% of those funds that reported some 
form of participation.  Lack of resources was the most common reason 
for not participating. 
In contrast to the difference in non-litigation activism based on 
the size of the fund, we find no such size difference for litigation-
related activism. Table 7 reports the fund responses to several 
categories of litigation-related activism. We report the p-value from a 
t-test of the difference in the fraction of small funds and large funds. 
 
Table 7 
 
Litigation Activity Fraction 
of Small 
Funds 
Fraction 
of Large 
Funds 
p-value 
Served as Lead Plaintiff in Securities 
Litigation 
0.500 0.583 0.615 
Served as Lead Plaintiff in Derivative 
Litigation 
0.063 0.208 0.216 
Opted out of Class Action and 
Pursued Individual Securities Fraud 
or Derivative Suit 
0.438 0.708 0.091 
Competed with Another Institution 
for Lead Plaintiff Role 
0.625 0.500 0.449 
Informally Participated in Litigation 0.313 0.333 0.894 
Attempted Unsuccessfully to Serve as 
Lead Plaintiff 
0.313 0.375 0.694 
Participated in Litigation over 
Shareholder Proposal 
0.000 0.042 0.421 
Sought Appraisal Remedy 0.000 0.043 0.412 
Other Corporate/Securities Litigation 0.000 0.167 0.089 
Objected to Proposed Settlement 0.000 0.083 0.247 
Objected to Proposed/Requested 
Attorney Fee Award 
0.188 0.292 0.469 
Litigation Sum 2.438 3.333 0.204 
 
Large funds opted out of class actions to pursue their own 
individual securities fraud or derivative suits more often than small 
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funds.38 Large funds also responded that they engaged in other forms 
of corporate or securities litigation more frequently than small funds. 
Both differences, however, are significant at only the 10% confidence 
level. Outside of these two areas, none of the differences in the other 
litigation activity categories are significant. Moreover, the overall 
Litigation Sum score for small funds is not significantly different than 
the score for large funds. 
What explained a fund’s decision to become active in litigation? 
We asked our sample funds why they sought appointment as lead 
plaintiffs. Among those funds that responded that they had sought the 
lead plaintiff position, Table 8 gives a breakdown of their primary 
reasons for participation. Table 8 also delineates the primary reasons 
for non-participation among funds that did not seek lead plaintiff 
status. 
Table 8 
 
Reason Sought Lead Plaintiff Position Number of 
Funds 
Percentage 
Large Losses; Large Size of Recovery 17 65.4% 
To Increase Recovery Amount; Affect 
Settlement; Deter Misconduct 
4 15.4% 
Particularly Egregious Fraud on the Merits 2 7.7% 
Fiduciary Responsibility 1 3.9% 
Other 2 7.7% 
Total 26 100.0% 
Note: “Other” includes the recommendation of the state Attorney General to pursue lead 
plaintiff appointment, among other reasons. 
Reason Did Not Seek Lead Plaintiff 
Position 
Number of 
Funds 
Percentage 
Insufficient Resources; Drain on Resources 7 43.8% 
Other Funds with Larger Losses 6 37.5% 
No Merit; No Worthwhile Suit 2 12.5% 
Other 1 6.3% 
Total 16 100.0% 
Note: “Other” includes opposition from fund trustees, among other reasons given from the 
same fund. 
 
 
 38. Given that opting out of a class action is economically rational only for a class member 
with a relatively large stake, this finding is not surprising. 
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By far the most important reason for the decision to seek lead 
plaintiff status is the size of the loss and corresponding size of the 
potential litigation recovery. Funds are concerned with the bottom line 
in pursuing litigation activism. 
Importantly, our findings reveal that litigation is not 
dominated by a subset of only the larger funds. Given the focus on the 
bottom line, what explains this lack of size differential for litigation-
related activism? One possible explanation is that litigation tends to 
generate a large amount of publicity. Regardless of size, public 
pension funds may engage in litigation-related activism precisely 
because of this publicity. Specifically, pension funds that face political 
pressure from external sources, such as the state Attorney General, 
may decide to engage in litigation activism even if they normally 
eschew non-litigation activism. 
A second possibility is that litigation activism, particularly 
service as lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class action, does not 
impose substantial costs on a fund. Despite the common response of 
insufficient resources on the part of funds that did not seek lead 
plaintiff status, plaintiffs’ firms typically bring these cases on a 
contingency fee basis, and funds incur no out-of-pocket costs other 
than the expenditure of time by fund personnel to monitor the case. 
Indeed, plaintiffs’ firms typically screen cases and identify pension 
funds with substantial stakes, so that funds need not incur 
investigation costs. The lower cost of litigation activism may make it 
accessible to firms that lack the resources for other types of 
governance. 
A third possibility is that participation in litigation may not 
always constitute activism. Although some public pension funds take 
an active role when they serve as lead plaintiff—monitoring counsel, 
negotiating a fee agreement, overseeing litigation strategy, and so 
forth39—others may not. One of the criticisms of securities fraud class 
representatives prior to the adoption of the PSLRA was their relative 
passivity in overseeing the litigation.40 The mere fact that a lead 
plaintiff is a public pension fund rather than an individual is not a 
guarantee of greater oversight. Recent studies suggest that public 
 
 39. See Fisch, supra note 25, at 704-10 (describing the active involvement of institutional 
investors in selecting lead counsel, negotiating fee agreements, and monitoring litigation); R. 
Randall Roche, My Experience as a Lead Plaintiff, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOCATE, at 1 
(2000), http://www.blbglaw.com/advocate/adv2000Q4.pdf (describing the author’s role as general 
counsel for the Louisiana Retirement Systems in monitoring the litigation against 3Com). 
 40. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2054 (1995) (describing such plaintiffs as “figurehead” plaintiffs). 
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pension fund involvement as lead plaintiff is correlated with greater 
settlement amounts and lower attorneys’ fees,41 but those studies 
cannot determine the frequency with which funds participate actively. 
Moreover, it is possible that public pension funds simply cherry pick 
the stronger securities suits; the higher recovery amounts may not be 
due to any added value from fund participation, but may reflect the 
ability of funds to select higher value suits with which to become 
involved.42 
A fourth explanation is that fund losses may not be correlated 
with fund size. A small fund may have a substantial loss in a 
particular issuer, justifying its involvement in litigation.43  Indeed, 
such a fund may have a greater incentive to participate in the 
litigation than a larger fund to the extent that its losses are, relative 
to its overall portfolio, economically significant. 
B. Delegation and Activism 
We hypothesize that funds that delegate more of their 
functions have fewer resources in-house to devote to activism. 
Delegating may indicate a preference for greater passivity that 
corresponds to lower levels of activism. Importantly, however, 
delegation also exposes funds to an agency problem: outside parties 
assisting funds in investment decisions (i.e., active portfolio managers) 
and voting decisions (i.e., ISS) may not necessarily make decisions in 
the best interests of the fund. Active portfolio managers, for example, 
simply may prefer to exit from poorly performing investments rather 
than attempt to improve corporate governance. Because, as suggested 
above, the factors that seem to drive litigation activism differ from 
non-litigation activism, we also hypothesize that a fund that delegates 
will not necessarily display the same lack of activity for litigation as 
for non-litigation related activity. 
As discussed above, funds choose to delegate many of their 
activities (see Table 1(b) above). We focus on three specific acts of 
delegation: (1) voting, (2) the preparation of voting guidelines, and (3) 
the processing of claims in securities litigation. We do not include the 
decision to delegate litigation screening because the significance of 
this variable is compromised by firms that do not participate in 
 
 41. Cox & Thomas, supra note 11, at 1636-39; Perino, supra note 11, at 24, 30-31. 
 42. See Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 25, at 892 (finding some empirical evidence 
consistent with the “cherry-picking” hypothesis). 
 43.  The likelihood of this event is increased to the extent that funds are stock picking rather 
than indexing. 
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litigation. We focus only on those decisions to delegate that are not 
related directly to our measures of non-litigation and litigation 
activism in order to avoid endogeneity problems. Whether a fund is 
engaged in one of our areas of activism, the fund will make separate 
decisions about the development of its voting guidelines, whether to 
delegate its decision to vote, and whether to outsource its claims 
processing. 
We take the decision to delegate in the areas of voting, 
development of voting guidelines, and claims processing as a proxy for 
the exogenous preference of the fund to outsource those activities as 
opposed to undertaking them in-house (with a corresponding 
commitment to fund them. “Delegation” is defined as follows: a score 
of 1 is given for each of the three delegations described above, and the 
sum is Delegation (so the score can range from 0 to 3). 
 
 (1) The fund describes its method of voting as (a) delegate voting 
authority to a proxy advisor in accordance with its recommendations, (b) 
do not vote, or (c) delegation to outside managers 
(2) The fund outsources the preparation of voting guidelines 
(3) The fund outsources the processing of its securities litigation claims 
 
Our hypothesis is that a fund with a preference to delegate (as proxied 
through our Delegation variable) will choose not to engage in activism. 
Table 9 reports summary statistics on the Delegation measure. 
 
Table 9: Passive and Active Funds Summary Statistics 
 
Measures of Activity Mean 25% 50% 75% Std. Dev. 
Delegation 1.7 0.0 1.5 3.0 1.027 
 
Relationship with Activism 
 
 Delegation 
≤ Median 
Delegation 
> Median 
p-value 
Activism 15.55 8.48 0.008 
Non-Litigation Activism 16.35 7.00 0.005 
Litigation Activism 3.30 2.65 0.349 
Note: p-value is for a t-test of the difference in means between the Delegation ≤ Median 
group and the Delegation > Median group. 
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Funds that choose to delegate more functions are likely to 
devote less effort and fewer resources to developing in-house 
knowledge and expertise about corporate governance. We find that 
funds that choose to delegate engage in far less non-litigation activity 
as compared with other funds (difference significant at the 1% 
significance level). Funds that delegate also engage in less non-
litigation activity, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
C. Multivariate Tests 
Our tests above examine the correlation between fund activism 
and (a) size and (b) a preference for passivity. To further test the 
differences between litigation and non-litigation activism, we perform 
a series of multivariate models to control for other factors that may 
affect a fund’s level of activism. 
Our models use one of two dependent variables based on our 
measures of fund activism: Non-Litigation Sum or Litigation Sum. 
Because both dependent variables are discrete and ordinal, we use an 
ordered logit model. 
In each of our models, we include three control variables. The 
first control is the fraction of the fund’s portfolio that is externally 
managed (Fraction Externally Managed). Funds with external 
managers may not take as close an interest in the corporate 
governance of the corporations in which they invest. The second 
control is the fraction of the fund’s portfolio in the form of U.S. 
publicly traded equity (Fraction Equity U.S.). Funds with more assets 
in U.S. publicly traded equity may have a greater incentive to engage 
in activism within the United States to boost the value of this equity. 
Our third control is the fraction of a fund’s assets that is indexed, as 
opposed to actively managed (Fraction Equity Index). The greater the 
fraction of indexed funds, the less incentive a fund may have to 
improve the corporate governance at any one particular company. On 
the other hand, indexed funds may be more active because they cannot 
respond to poor governance through exit. 
To test the impact of size, we include fund assets in each 
regression. To test the relationship between delegation and activism, 
we include the Delegation variable. Lastly, we include an indicator 
variable, Public Official Decisionmaker, to test whether having a 
public official in direct decisionmaking authority for a fund results in 
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greater activism.44 Public Official Decisionmaker is defined as equal to 
1 if a fund responded that decisionmaking authority is vested in an 
elected or appointed public official and 0 otherwise.45 
Table 10 reports the results from our multivariate tests. 
 
Table 10 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable Non-Litigation Sum Litigation Sum 
Independent Variables   
Assets 0.075*** 0.012 
 (3.860) (1.000) 
Delegation -0.781** -0.125 
 (-1.990) (-0.330) 
Public Official  2.949* 0.701 
Decisionmaker (1.780) (0.550) 
Fraction Externally  -2.235 -2.497 
Managed (-1.130) (-1.510) 
Fraction Equity U.S. -3.939 -10.031** 
 (-0.890) (-2.190) 
Fraction Equity Index -4.476** 0.388 
 (-2.260) (0.230) 
N 38 38 
Log Likelihood -87.981 -71.282 
***1%, **5%, *10% significance level.  z-statistic in parentheses. 
 
 44. The degree of oversight exercised by a public official may differ from that official’s legal 
authority. Because we are concerned with actual involvement rather than the legal right to 
exercise oversight, we code based on the official’s involvement as reported by our sample funds. 
 45. Most of our funds did not report a public official as the decisionmaker. Instead, we 
found that 90% of our funds were governed by a board of governors, trustees, or directors. This 
finding is consistent with Schneider, who states that the majority of public pension funds are 
administered by a board. Schneider, supra note 8, at 110. Our interview data revealed that board 
composition varies significantly. Some boards contain a number of public officials, some contain 
primarily current or retired plan members, and some contain a number of independent members 
similar to the outside directors of corporations. Our survey, however, did not request information 
on the board composition of responding funds; nor did it allow us to determine the extent to 
which boards are likely to be influenced by local politics. 
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Note from Table 10 the lack of correlation between fund size 
and litigation activism.46 Unlike non-litigation activism, litigation 
draws equally from large and small firms. This finding is noteworthy 
in light of the fact that the funds most commonly explain their lack of 
activism (both litigation and non-litigation) as the result of their small 
size and limited resources. Our results are consistent with the recent 
report by Cornerstone Research, indicating that the funds most active 
in litigation in 2006, by number of lawsuits, were Teachers’ 
Retirement System of Louisiana ($14 billion in assets), Local 144 
Nursing Home Pension Fund ($8.2 billion including several other 
funds), Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund ($4.3 billion), 
Louisiana School Employees Retirement System ($1.5 billion), and the 
Louisiana State Employees Retirement System ($7.8 billion). 
Similar to our univariate results, Delegation correlates with a 
lesser degree of Non-Litigation activism (at the 1% significance level). 
In contrast, Delegation does not correlate with a lesser degree of 
litigation activism. Funds appear to distinguish between non-litigation 
and litigation-related activities. Funds that perform fewer functions 
in-house are not more limited in their litigation-related activities. 
Table 10 reports that funds with an appointed or elected public 
official as the decisionmaker engage in greater non-litigation activism 
(significant at the 10% level). It is unclear whether such public 
decisionmakers are motivated by shareholder or public welfare or 
simply seeking to increase their personal visibility, possibly to further 
the goal of attaining higher office. Under the civic republicanism view 
of the political process, the involvement of public officials should 
increase accountability and lead to socially desirable levels of 
participation in corporate governance.47 On the other hand, some 
commentators have accused public officials of using pension fund 
activism to pursue political objectives that are inconsistent with the 
 
 46. Despite this finding, there remains a substantial degree of correlation between non-
litigation activism and litigation activism. The correlation coefficient was equal to 0.6598. 
 47. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political 
Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1611 (2006) (describing civic 
republicanism); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
562 (2000) (explaining that “civic republicanism portrays government as a moral force for the 
common good”). 
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financial interests of fund beneficiaries.48 Our data provide no bases 
for testing between those competing hypotheses.49 
Table 10 also reports that funds with more of their assets held 
in an equity index are significantly less likely to engage in non-
litigation activism. Indexed funds generally are less active. This 
finding is surprising, in that it counters the argument that indexed 
investors will be more active because they cannot sell poorly 
performing portfolio companies.50 It suggests, however, that activism 
may be driven largely by a fund’s available resources and that highly 
indexed funds may seek to maximize their returns by minimizing 
operating costs. On the other hand, more heavily indexed funds are no 
less likely to engage in litigation activism, suggesting that litigation 
activism does not involve substantial out-of-pocket costs. 
Lastly, Table 10 reports that there is no correlation between a 
public decisionmaker and higher levels of litigation activism. This 
finding casts some question on the claim that officials participate in 
litigation in an effort to attract political contributions from plaintiffs’ 
firms—so-called “pay to play.”51 We find no evidence that the 
involvement of public officials correlates with greater litigation 
activism. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The funds that we talked to were extremely interested in the 
amount of activism engaged in by their peer firms. Despite the fairly 
high visibility of much fund activism, we found that funds are largely 
unaware of each others’ activities. In part, limited awareness may 
reflect the fact that state and local government actors, particularly at 
smaller funds, have limited opportunities to interact with their peer 
institutions unless they seek out those activities through corporate 
governance organizations and other networking. 
Regardless of activity level, all funds described their reasons 
for activism in terms of improving returns for their beneficiaries and 
increasing shareholder value. Yet in our more detailed interviews, 
 
 48. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, California Pension Activist Expects to Be Ousted, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at C1 (describing claims that “the Calpers board had begun to range far 
away from its fiduciary duty of protecting the retirement fund and had begun to engage in 
political activism”). 
 49. See Roberta Romano, The Politics of Public Pension Funds, PUB. INT., Spring 1995, at 
42, 47-49 (identifying potential effect of political pressure on public funds’ involvement in 
corporate governance, and describing two examples of such pressure). 
 50. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 19 (making this argument). 
 51. See Fisch, supra note 25, at 715-16 (describing claims of pay to play). 
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fund officials exhibited very little familiarity with existing empirical 
evidence on corporate governance, such as studies analyzing the value 
of poison pills, independent boards, or shareholder litigation. It 
appears that, although public pension funds have, as a group, bought 
into the claim that shareholder activism improves corporate 
performance, they have little basis for ascertaining the truth of that 
claim. A possible reason for this is the fairly widespread participation 
of public pension funds in corporate governance organizations and 
programs. The conceptual relationship between good governance and 
corporate performance is heavily featured in these programs, but the 
underlying empirical studies are not. 
At the same time, the limited expertise of public pension funds 
probably explains both their choice of non-governance activities and 
their limited overall activism. As we noted above, public funds make 
relatively little use of company-specific forms of activism such as 
shareholder proposals and director nominations. One possible reason 
may be the perception that fund officials are not well positioned to 
determine weaknesses in individual firm governance structures and to 
propose appropriate reforms.52 In contrast, union funds, which are far 
more active, tend to focus their proposals most heavily on 
employment-related topics, on which they presumably believe that 
they have particular expertise.53 Similarly, social responsibility funds 
and religious organizations can make effective use of shareholder 
proposals because of their developed knowledge about topics within 
their mission.54 
Lack of expertise is even more likely to explain the failure of 
public pension funds to become involved in the process of identifying 
 
 52. This perception is consistent with empirical evidence failing to demonstrate that public 
pension fund use of shareholder proposals improves corporate performance. See, e.g., Roberta 
Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of 
Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 177 (2001) (summarizing the empirical 
literature). It is also consistent with our finding that many funds do not have voting guidelines 
and have never recalled loaned stock in order to vote it. These actions suggest a lack of 
willingness or ability to evaluate governance policies at specific firms. 
 53. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 
F. Supp. 877, 879-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (addressing union’s shareholder proposals concerning Wal-
Mart’s Equal Employment Opportunity policies and programs); see also Marleen O’Connor, 
Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 
113-21 (2000) (describing labor unions’ use of shareholder proposals to promote workers’ as well 
as investors’ interests); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to 
Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 47-52 (1998) (describing history of labor 
unions’ use of shareholder proposals). 
 54. See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder 
Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 365, 382-85 (2006) (describing the use of human rights social policy proposals by 
religious investors, socially responsible funds, and social justice organizations). 
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director candidates. As noted in Table 2 above, none of our sample 
funds either submitted the names of director candidates to nominating 
committees or formally nominated a director candidate in opposition 
to management. It is likely that public pension funds simply lack the 
capacity to identify suitable candidates. Public fund officials do not 
have specialized knowledge about director qualifications or regular 
contact with the types of people who might make good nominees, such 
as current or retired business leaders. Nor do public pension funds 
have relationships with intermediaries who can assist them in 
identifying potential directors; funds do not, for example, have director 
search firms on retainer.55 
A second obvious consideration is cost. Of the firms that 
responded to our survey, only seven (fewer than 20%) had a separate 
budget for corporate governance activities. As government agencies, 
public funds are subject to substantial financial constraints, and, in 
responding to our survey, virtually every fund identified cost as a 
substantial consideration in determining the extent of its activism. In 
addition, the payoff for shareholder activism is relatively opaque, 
making it difficult for public officials to justify expenditures in terms 
of an identifiable return. It is therefore unsurprising that the highest 
levels of participation were focused on extremely low cost activities, 
including communicating with other institutions, participating in 
corporate governance organizations, voting no, and serving as lead 
plaintiff. 
It may be the case, however, that this attempted fiscal 
prudence is somewhat short-sighted. Arguably, pension funds pay for 
shareholder activism indirectly through their investments in hedge 
funds and private equity (which do participate in extensive activism) 
and through their use of external fund managers who may engage in 
various levels of activism, ranging from full-scale proxy contests to 
behind-the-scenes meetings with management. Although the funding 
for this type of activism is not politically transparent in the pension 
fund’s budget, it ultimately may cost funds more in higher 
management fees than if funds engaged in activism directly. 
Funds also appear concerned about the perceived legitimacy of 
their actions. Several funds reported that their trustees were 
uncomfortable with public demonstrations of activism. One fund also 
cited the “headline risk” associated with shareholder activism. These 
concerns may reflect, in part, the longstanding regulatory constraints 
 
 55.    Failure of funds to nominate director candidates may also be motivated by a fear that 
such actions could result in the application of the short swing trading restrictions of section 16(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act. 
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on some types of shareholder activism. Institutions may perceive more 
recent efforts to encourage institutional activism, such as the SEC’s 
relaxation of its proxy rules as equivocal, especially in light of 
opposition efforts to characterize activism as politically motivated or 
driven by special interests. 
Finally, public funds make extensive use of intermediaries. The 
availability of services or agents who provide expertise and manpower 
is a substantial factor in determining whether funds will become 
involved, especially if those services are available at little or no 
additional cost to the fund. Thus, funds are willing to exercise their 
voting power, but rely heavily on the assistance of proxy advisors to 
formulate guidelines, make case-specific voting decisions, and submit 
proxies. Funds file claim forms, but primarily through outside services 
or custodians. Funds screen securities fraud claims and participate as 
lead plaintiffs, but largely in response to the entrepreneurial efforts of 
plaintiffs’ counsel. Funds submit amicus briefs—an effort largely 
controlled by the same lawyer-entrepreneurs—but do not otherwise 
seek broad-based market improvements through lobbying, petitions 
for rulemaking, or similar initiatives. 
The foregoing factors likely explain the substantial difference 
between public pension fund participation in securities litigation and 
other forms of activism—both the greater overall level of involvement 
by public pension funds in litigation activism and the lack of 
correlation between litigation activism and fund size. Service as lead 
plaintiff does not require funds to incur out-of-pocket costs other than 
the relatively low visibility cost of staff time. Indeed, regular fund 
staff may not face that burden because, for many public funds, their 
litigation activism is carried out largely through the state Attorney 
General’s office. Although litigation might seem to require some 
expertise in evaluating claims, outside services and lawyers provide 
this expertise—preparing damage models, evaluating claim strength, 
and outlining litigation strategy. These resources allow even small 
funds without the resources for active participation in corporate 
governance to serve as lead plaintiffs. Finally, the adoption of the lead 
plaintiff provision and the legislative history of the PSLRA send a 
strong message that litigation activism is desirable from a public 
policy perspective. This message has been enhanced by the highly 
publicized corporate scandals of the late 1990s and by the success of 
institutional investors in cases such as Cendant and WorldCom in 
recovering significant settlements and holding wrongdoers 
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accountable.56 Fund decisionmakers—from elected officials, to 
trustees, to staffers—are government actors for whom public and 
congressional opinions are of substantial importance. 
What are the implications of our findings? They may be 
particularly relevant with respect to the potential effect of ongoing 
efforts to reform the federal proxy rules to increase the role of 
institutional investors. The SEC, in response to requests that it 
facilitate the exercise of shareholder power through the voting 
process,57 substantially amended the proxy rules in 1992 to enable 
institutional investors to communicate more easily in proxy 
solicitations. Several years ago, the SEC proposed, but did not adopt, 
Rule 14a-11, which would have increased the ability of shareholders—
particularly institutional investors—to nominate director candidates 
directly.58 More recently, the SEC considered but failed to adopt rule 
changes that would have increased the ability of shareholders to 
introduce bylaw amendments through the shareholder proposal 
process.59 
Our survey results cast doubt on the extent to which public 
pension funds are likely to engage in these types of initiatives. The 
introduction of shareholder proposals, participation in proxy 
solicitations, and nomination of director candidates are all costly.  
While larger funds may have the resources to justify these costs, small 
funds lack both the dollars and the manpower to engage in this type of 
activism. In addition, these activities require funds to make a 
judgment that the governance structure of their portfolio companies is 
inadequate. Public pension funds appear unwilling or perhaps unable 
to make that judgment, in part because they lack the expertise and in 
 
 56. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Settlements Totaled $5.4 Billion For Securities Class Actions in 
‘04, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2005, at C4 (describing record settlements in Cendant and WorldCom). 
 57. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 
675, 677 (2007) (advocating increasing shareholder voting power through mandatory contested 
elections); Letter from Richard H. Koppes, Gen. Counsel, CalPERS, to Linda C. Quinn, Dir., Div. 
of Corp. Fin., SEC 3 (Nov. 3, 1989) (requesting SEC rule-making to revise federal proxy rules). 
 58. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274). 
 59. See Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160 (July 27, 2007) (describing 
history of SEC’s consideration of increased shareholder power to nominate directors through 
access to the corporate proxy); Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 
Exchange Act Release No. 56,914 (Dec. 7, 2007) (amending federal proxy rules to limit 
shareholder access). In connection with its most recent rule change, Chairman Cox stated that 
the SEC would continue to study proxy access and revisit the issue of shareholder access. 
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the SEC Open Meeting: Electronic Shareholder 
Forum Rules; Codification of Interpretation of Rule 14(a)(8)(i)(8), (Nov. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch112807cc.htm. 
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part because such judgments are inconsistent with their delegation of 
investment authority to external portfolio managers, who implicitly 
make that judgment in connection with their investment decisions. 
On the other hand, public funds might view SEC rulemaking 
as legitimizing or even demanding greater participation in the director 
nomination process. The experience with the lead plaintiff provision 
suggests that such a statement may outweigh the general desire 
among funds to remain passive and non-confrontational. It is, of 
course, unclear whether funds would respond to such a determination 
by the SEC in the same manner as they would to a statement by the 
democratically elected Congress. In our interviews, funds reported 
respect for the SEC and its role in protecting investors’ rights, 
suggesting that they would view SEC action as significant. 
Our survey also offers guidance for the SEC in its rulemaking 
approach. The common assumption that public pension funds will be 
willing to spend more than retail investors on voting, shareholder 
proposals, lobbying, and so forth because of the larger size of funds’ 
holdings60 may be misplaced. Because cost is a substantial concern, 
shareholder initiatives that do not require substantial expenditures 
are likely to generate greater public pension fund involvement. 
Regulatory changes that enable public pension funds to exercise 
greater influence at relatively low cost—such as majority voting and 
bylaw amendments—are particularly promising. Regulatory changes 
that allow institutional investors to recover the costs of sponsoring 
successful initiatives also should be considered. In addition, proposals 
that generate some sort of reimbursement or subsidization might 
create an economic incentive for intermediaries to mobilize pension 
funds in the same way that entrepreneurial lawyers have spurred 
litigation activism. 
Finally, public pension funds’ extensive reliance on 
intermediaries should be acknowledged. Our research shows that 
public pension funds engage in very limited internal decisionmaking; 
they rely heavily on outside lawyers, services, proxy advisors, and so 
forth. The plaintiffs’ bar appears to play a critical role in determining 
public fund involvement in securities litigation, and the lack of 
intermediaries with the economic incentive to mobilize non-litigation 
activism is likely a substantial factor explaining the limited levels of 
participation in such activism. 
 
 60. See, e.g., Jill Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1009, 1010 (1994) (describing claim that larger institutional stakes will lead to more 
common and more efficient monitoring). 
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The reliance of pension funds on intermediaries further 
suggests that the structure and incentives of those intermediaries 
warrant further study. Reliance on intermediaries creates an 
additional layer of agency costs that is likely to depend critically on 
the incentives of proxy advisor, such as ISS, and active portfolio 
managers, incentives that may differ substantially from those of the 
funds themselves. These agency costs are of particular concern in light 
of recent developments in shareholder voting power. Majority voting, 
for example, offers institutional investors potentially new power over 
director elections.61 “Say on pay” provisions have been considered at a 
number of issuers, and Congress is considering legislation that would 
mandate a non-binding vote on executive compensation.62 In debating 
the desirability of increased shareholder voting rights, policymakers 
should consider the extent to which public pension funds and, 
potentially, other institutional investors may rely on agents, such as 
proxy advisors, in deciding how to exercise these rights.63 
CONCLUSION 
We report results from a unique survey of public pension funds 
gauging the participation of these funds in a wide range of corporate 
governance-related activities. While some highly visible funds, such as 
CalPERS, engage in a number of different governance activities, most 
funds in our study engage in only a limited subset of activities. 
Moreover, the precise activities selected by different funds vary 
substantially. 
Our results demonstrate that size is strongly correlated with 
non-litigation activism. Larger funds have a greater ability to spread 
the fixed cost of engaging in activism across their greater asset base. 
Surprisingly, however, size is not correlated with the incidence of 
litigation activism. Instead, funds of all sizes engage in litigation 
 
 61. See, e.g., Louis Lavelle, Commentary: A Simple Way to Make Boards Behave, BUS. WK., 
Jan. 31, 2005, at 38 (advocating a switch from plurality to majority voting). According to 
CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS 1 (Nov. 2007), 
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy111207.pdf, 57% of Fortune 500 companies 
had adopted some form of majority voting by November 2007. 
 62. See Marlene Kennedy, Getting a Say on Pay for Execs, TIMESUNION.COM, Apr. 20, 2007, 
http://timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=582473&category=BUSINESS&newsdate=4
/20/2007 (describing the progress of H.R. 1257, sponsored by Barney Frank, in Congress). 
 63. We note that although ISS has dominated the market for proxy advisory services for 
many years, several other firms recently have begun issuing proxy recommendations including 
Proxy Governance, Glass Lewis, and Egan-Jones. Thus far, public pension funds are relying 
heavily on ISS, but when other advisors begin to penetrate the market, the information available 
to funds will increase dramatically. 
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activism. Funds appear to treat non-litigation and litigation activism 
separately. Funds that structure themselves to delegate more 
functions and consequently have fewer in-house resources, as reflected 
in our Delegation variable, do not engage in significantly lower levels 
of litigation activism (although they report significantly lower levels of 
non-litigation activism). One possible explanation for the difference is 
cost. The subsidization of private securities litigation through the 
class action mechanism combined with contingency fee awards 
appears to affect the ability of state governmental actors—particularly 
small pension funds that otherwise are not active in corporate 
governance—to participate. 
Several questions remain unanswered from our study. One 
important question is the extent to which our findings extend to other 
types of institutions. Hedge funds, mutual funds, and other 
institutions are subject to dramatically different funding structures 
and market constraints. At the same time, other institutions may lack 
the political influence that simultaneously gives public pension funds 
greater autonomy from portfolio companies and greater reason to be 
motivated by non-financial considerations in their choice of activism. 
A second question is the degree to which public pension fund 
activism is evolving and will continue to evolve. In the twelve years 
since the adoption of the PSLRA, public pension funds have increased 
their involvement in securities fraud litigation dramatically, primarily 
through service as lead plaintiffs, but also through direct lawsuits and 
objecting to proposed settlements. Studies show that such activism is 
correlated with higher settlements and lower attorneys’ fees. It 
remains to be seen whether corporate governance scandals like those 
at Enron and WorldCom, stock options backdating, and the continued 
explosive growth of executive compensation will spur funds to extend 
their involvement to other forms of activism. The potential is 
particularly great for public funds to add their voice, through their 
vote, to the more entrepreneurial activism of hedge funds. 
Finally, public pension fund activism seems to be, in part, a 
function of the applicable regulatory environment. Public pension 
funds began to participate in litigation in response to the lead plaintiff 
provision of the PSLRA.64 Public pension funds are paying increased 
attention to voting, through the adoption of voting guidelines and 
increased disclosure of their votes, in response to recent regulatory 
 
 64. See Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 25 (reporting little participation by institutional 
investors as lead plaintiffs prior to the adoption of the PSLRA and increased involvement 
following the adoption of the statute). 
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requirements focusing on mutual fund voting.65 Although public 
pension funds may display conservatism in their governance 
activities, as government actors they are likely to be highly responsive 
to the public policy judgments reflected in legislation and SEC rules 
concerning the appropriate level and extent of their participation in 
corporate governance. 
 
 65. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 
47, 304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922 (Jan. 31, 2003) (requiring mutual funds to 
disclose their voting policies as well as their actual proxy votes). 
